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Abstract
We build a two sector (agriculture and manufacturing) heterogenous agent model
to analyze the e¤ects of a food subsidy program on output and prices. The government
may nance this subsidy by levying a distortionary income tax or a tax on manufactur-
ing consumption. We nd that in the long run the program increases the food output
but lowers the manufacturing output, in both methods of its nancing. While the
price of food crop relative to the price of manufacturing good falls with subsidies in the
income tax regime, the e¤ect is opposite in the consumption tax regime. We also nd
that the food subsidy program may have long-run welfare gains for the two agents, but
only for a certain range of subsidies. However, our simulations suggest that there is no
subsidies which benet both agents at the same time. Further, nancing this program
using an indirect consumption tax is a Pareto improvement over the direct income tax
regime.
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1 Introduction
Post 2008 world food price shocks, food security concerns have come to the forefront of de-
velopmental policy. In the period 200012, even though the world food production outpaced
the world population growth (wheat grew at an annualized rate of 1.05%, rice by 1.45%, and
meat by 2.12% while the world population grew by 1.11%), in 2013 about 12% of the world
population was undernourished (FAO, IFAD, and WFP (2013)). Despite the fact that food
is available, it seems that either food is not available in a consistent manner or some people
lack access to food.1
The FAO 2013 report (FAO, IFAD, and WFP (2013)) highlights problems in all three
aspects of food security food a¤ordability, access to food and its nutritional content. In
the period 2000-12, world real food prices rose by 4.37% annually (FAOSTAT database),
which means that food was not a¤ordable by the marginalized sections of the society. Other
factors like decline in agricultural investment, higher volatilities in short-run supply and
demand, rapidly increasing oil prices, diversions of maize to ethanol production, and mid-
dlemen hoarding have contributed to peoples lack of access to food. Even when there is
access to food, the nutritional content of food is a worrisome issue. On the one hand the
developing world is facing widely prevalent undernourishment and on the other hand the
developed nations are ghting obesity problems.
Policy makers across the world have taken concrete measures to combat food insecurity.
The United Nations World Food Programme has several projects aimed at improving ac-
cess to nutritious food for people living in developing countries, like food e-vouchers and
vouchers, cash and food for work, improving food logistics, connecting farmers to market,
to name a few (World Food Programme (2013)). Several countries have laid constitutional
and legal protection to the human right to food (Knuth and Vidar (2011)). Recently, India
joined the existing group of nine countries2 to provide its citizens the right to food by law.
Knuth and Vidar (2011) note that while legal protection of right to food is an important
step towards ensuring food security, it needs to be accompanied by dedicated government
e¤orts in implementing it. Countries which have made signicant progress in improving
their food security status have done so primarily through social programs like food sub-
sidies, employment schemes, support to agricultural production, school meals, etc. (FAO,
1In 2011-13, around one in eight people in the world are likely to have su¤ered from chronic hunger, not
having enough food for an active and healthy life. The vast majority of these hungry people 827 million of
them live in developing regions, where the prevalence of undernourishment is now estimated at 14.3%.(See
FAO, IFAD, and WFP (2013))
2In 2013, the nine countries that recognized the right to food as a separate and stand-alone right were
Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, South Africa, Nepal and Nicaragua. (Knuth and Vidar
(2011))
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IFAD, and WFP (2014)). To consider an example, India implemented the seminal Right
to Food Act in 2013, where this law aims to provide food and nutritional security [...], by
ensuring access to adequate quantity of quality food at a¤ordable prices to people to live a
life with dignity(The Gazette of India, September, 2013). The law plans to achieve its goals
by providing subsidized food grains to approximately two-thirds of Indias 1.2 billion people
in the hope that it would signicantly improve their nutritional status. Pregnant women,
lactating mothers, and certain categories of children are eligible for daily free meals. In a
country where 40% of children below 5 years of age are undernourished, the intent of this
law is to meet the domestic demand as well as access, at the individual level, to adequate
quantities of food at a¤ordable prices(see The Gazette of India, September, 2013).
These food subsidy programs across the globe, on the one hand will provide nutrition
to the poorer sections of the society who in turn can work more e¢ ciently and contribute
positively to the countrys GDP. On the other hand, the wealthier sections of the society
would be taxed to nance these social programs, which may curb investment and long run
growth of the economy. Who gains, who loses and in what conditions are some questions
that need to be answered. Further, the food subsidy program has a di¤erential impact on
the output of the agricultural sector as compared to (say) the manufacturing sector. It is
an interesting question to ask how do the sectoral outputs change and what are the e¤ects
on relative prices. In this paper, we isolate the increased nutritionchannel through which
the food subsidy is intended to a¤ect the economy, and try to understand the e¤ects of food
subsidy program on sectoral outputs, their prices and welfare of agents.
We model a developing economy, where the agents are heterogeneous in their assets
ownership.3 One agent, entrepreneur, is endowed with capital while the other agent, farmer,
is not. The agents are consumer-producers, whose objectives are to maximize their individual
utilities subject to their respective budgets. The farmer uses his labor to produce food crop
and cash crop, where the former is a nal good and the latter is an intermediate good. The
entrepreneur employs cash crop, his labor, and capital to produce the manufacturing output,
which is another nal good.
While the consumption of both nal goods provides utility to the two agents, these goods
have other additional purposes. Consumption of food provides energy to the agents and is
the source for their labor abilities. Agents need to consume a minimum quantity of food
to survive. After this subsistence need is met, food consumption increases labor capacity.
The relation is increasing and concave. This is a novel feature of this paper where we use a
3Antoci et al (2010) assert that in developing economies asset ownership is highly concentrated. Like our
economy, in their model of a developing economy, they assume heterogenous agents where one agent owns
capital while the other does not.
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metabolism function to capture the food to labor supply conversion. It is this route through
which the food subsidy a¤ects the well-being of the agents and hence a¤ects the other
macroeconomic variables like output and prices. The manufacturing good has the additional
role of being the capital good. The entrepreneur invests a part of his income in augmenting
his next periods capital stock this means that the entrepreneur participates in a saving
technology to which the farmer has no access. This is a typical feature of developing countries
(as noted in Conning and Udry (2007)) and later forms the basis for the tax structures that
are imposed on the agents.
To begin with, we assume that the economy is food secure, i.e. the productivity of food
production is su¢ ciently high so that the subsistence needs of both agents are met. The
government introduces a social program where it provides subsidy on the food consumption
to both agents at an exogenous rate. The two agents may get di¤erent subsidies. The
government may nance this program by either levying a direct tax or an indirect tax.
Under the direct tax regime, the entrepreneur has to pay taxes proportional to his income,4
while in the indirect tax regime, a consumption tax is imposed on both the farmer and the
entrepreneur on their manufacturing goods consumption. The tax rates are xed so that
the government balances its budget. The model is fairly complex. We examine the e¤ect of
farmers subsidy and the entrepreneurs subsidy on the di¤erent variables through numerical
simulations.
In this economy, we nd that in both tax regimes, the subsidy program increases the
steady state agriculture output but lowers the steady state manufacturing output. The
two taxes are levied either on manufacturing income or manufacturing consumption, which
negatively a¤ects either the supply or the demand of manufacturing good. In both cases,
the net e¤ect is that the subsidies adversely a¤ect the manufacturing output. At the same
time, by providing food subsidy the government makes the consumption of food cheaper,
which in turn boosts the demand for food. Thus, the food subsidy program increases food
output at the expense of manufacturing output.
The e¤ects on relative prices are di¤erent in the two tax regimes. In the income tax
regime, the long run price of the food crop relative to the price of the manufacturing good
declines with subsidies, while in the consumption tax regime it increases with subsidies.
In both tax regimes, the subsidy program raises the demand for food, which increases the
nominal price of food. However, the tax regime has di¤erent e¤ects in the manufacturing
sector. In the income tax regime the subsidies lower the supply of manufacturing output,
4In India agricultural income is exempted from taxation. China also abolished agricultural taxes in 2006.
Other developing countries like South Africa, Brazil, etc. farmers are subjected to proportional income
taxes. However, in these countries taxation of entrepreneurs is a larger and a more signicant source of the
governments income (see China Internet Information Centre (2005)).
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which increases the nominal price of manufacturing good so much so that price of food
relative to that of manufacturing falls. In the consumption tax regime the subsidies lower
the demand for manufacturing consumption, hence lowering the nominal price of food which
implies that relative price of food relative increases. The di¤erential e¤ect of the tax regimes
on manufacturing demand and supply explains the subsidy e¤ect on relative prices.
We also determine the programs welfare e¤ects on the farmer and the entrepreneur.
Compared to the no subsidy regime, the agentssteady state welfare improves only for a
certain range of subsidies. To understand this, let us consider the farmers welfare. The
farmers food consumption increases with his own subsidies. This translates into higher la-
bor units and hence increased leisure. At the same time, an increase in the farmers subsidy
decreases the supply of manufacturing output and hence the farmers consumption of manu-
facturing good falls with his subsidy. It is only for medium levels of farmers subsidy, which
boosts the farmers consumption of food and leisure, and does not have a large adverse e¤ect
on his manufacturing goods consumption, that the farmers welfare is higher in the subsidy
program. The entrepreneurs subsidy has an unambiguously negative e¤ect on farmerwel-
fare. The entrepreneurs subsidy does not boost farmers food consumption or leisure, and
further it adversely a¤ects his manufacturing consumption. Thus, it is the combination of
low subsidies to the entrepreneur and medium subsidies to the farmer that improves farmers
welfare. Analogous reasoning holds for the entrepreneurs welfare medium entrepreneurial
subsidies and low farmers subsidies yield higher entrepreneurs welfare. In fact, our simula-
tions suggest that there may be no subsidy combination in which both the agents are better
o¤ in the subsidy program as compared to the no subsidy program. One agents welfare im-
provement may be accompanied with a loss in the other agents welfare. This highlights that
government needs to be prudent in choosing the level of subsidies to the agents as di¤erent
subsidy combinations benet di¤erent categories of people.
Comparing between the income tax regime and the consumption tax regime, we nd that
nancing this program using an indirect consumption tax regime compared to a direct income
tax regime gives higher welfare to both agents. On normative grounds, our paper therefore
suggests that while such a subsidy program may only have limited gains in a heterogeneous
agent economy, it is best to implement this program by sharing the tax burden between the
two agents through an indirect tax to nance the food subsidy program. The subsidy
program will unequivocally improve the health status of all the beneciaries, but this by
itself does not yield any signicant welfare improvements. In this economy, though subsidy
increases the labor capacity of both agents, but due to capital market frictions, it comes
at the cost of capital deaccumulation. The subsidy program increases only the farmers
income, but he can not invest his income in any saving technology which implies that health
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improvements do not translate into higher growth of the economy. The paper outlines that
there are limits to the benets of a food subsidy program. Other complementary policy
interventions are needed which enable better health to yield increase in output, welfare and
possibly growth.
In the next section, we model the income tax regime. We build the model and present the
simulation results. In Section 3 we analyze the economy with an alternative manufacturing
consumption tax. Finally we conclude in Section 4 with policy recommendations.
2 Income Tax Regime
In this section we present the model economy with the government nancing the food subsidy
program using a distortionary income tax. This is a heterogenous agent economy, where the
two innitely lived agents are a farmer and an entrepreneur. The entrepreneur is born
with capital, while the farmer is not. This di¤erence in ownership of asset also dictates
the choice of the agents occupation. Further, there is occupational immobility the farmer
cannot participate in entrepreneurial activities and the entrepreneur does not want to do the
labor-intensive farming work. The entrepreneur does not prefer to do agricultural work over
manufacturing jobs because the former is more labor-intensive and hence harder. Further,
working in the capital sector may be considered more modern and hence is looked up to,
which tilts the entrepreneurs occupational choice towards manufacturing production. We
capture this occupational immobility in the model by assuming that agents prefer to work
in the sector where they can make use of their resources. Thus, the farmer uses his labor
to produce two agricultural goods a food crop and a cash crop. The cash crop is used
only as an intermediate input. The entrepreneur uses cash crop along with his labor and
capital to produce manufacturing goods only. Introduction of cash crops enable us to analyze
the e¤ects of the subsidy program within the agriculture sector, in particular, to compare
subsidized food crop production with other agricultural products.
As in Jiny and Zengz (2007) these agents are household producers. Consumption of the
manufacturing good, food, and leisure provides utility to the agents. We now present the
model economy in greater detail.
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2.1 The Representative Farmer
The farmer produces a food crop, Qat, and a cash crop, Qct. The two crops are produced
using fully labor intensive CRS technologies, such that
Qat = ALat (1)
Qct = CLct
where Lat is labor employed in food production and Lct is labor employed in cash crop
production. A and C are total factor productivities (TFPs) that augment the production of
the two crops. A and C are assumed to be constants.
Labor capacity is endogenous. We assume the following simple function, which is termed
metabolism function as it captures the conversion of food to labor units,
LFt =
(
0 for Xat < 1
1  1
Xat
for Xat  1
(2)
where Xat denotes farmers consumption of food crop. The metabolism function, LFt , is
plotted in Figure 1. LFt is a continuous function in Xat. For Xat > 1, farmers labor
capacity is strictly increasing and concave in food consumption. Xat = 1 captures subsistence
consumption, below which the farmer has no energy to supply labor.
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
The parametrization of endogenous labor capacity in our model is technically similar
to the functional relationship between food consumption and labor productivity as in Bliss
and Stern (1978). A similar functional relationship between labor productivity and food
consumption is also assumed in Dasgupta and Ray (1986) and Dasgupta (1997). In these
papers, the authors assume that all households are endowed with a xed number of labor
hours, however the productivity of these labor hours depends on food consumption. Unlike
in this literature however, we do not di¤erentiate between labor hours and labor productivity.
In this paper the metabolism function is the e¤ectivelabor hours. An analogous way of
interpreting this is as if the agent (in this economy) is endowed with one unit of labor hours
and the labor productivity function is of the form LFt .
As mentioned before, food consumption has dual purposes, as an input in the labor
capacity function and as a utility providing good. In all, the farmer derives utility from
three goods: consumption of food, consumption of manufacturing good, and leisure. His
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utility function is
UFt = 1 lnXmt + 2 lnXlt + (1  1   2) lnXat; 0 < 1; 2 < 1 (3)
where Xmt is his manufacturing good consumption and Xlt is units of the labor endowment
spent in leisure. The farmer has two sources of income: revenues from sale of food crop
and cash crop. He spends this income in purchasing food and the manufacturing good. His
budget is
(1  f1)patXat +Xmt = patALat + pctC

1  1
Xat
  Lat  Xlt

; (4)
where we have assumed that the manufacturing good is the numeraire, and pat and pct denote
the relative price of the food crop and the cash crop respectively. Note that we have already
used the farmers full employment condition in the budget constraint by substituting it for
employment in cash crop production (Lct) as Lct = LFt  Lat Xlt:The government extends a
per-unit subsidy of f1 on the farmers consumption of the food crop, so e¤ectively the farmer
has to spend (1   f1)pat for purchasing one unit of food. The farmer maximizes his utility
(3) subject to its budget (4) by choosing Xmt, Xat, Xlt; and Lat. The optimization yields
1  2
Xat
=
1
3

Xat(1  f1)
A
  1
Xat

; (5)
Xmt =

1
1  1   2

patA

Xat(1  f1)
A
  1
Xat

; (6)
Xlt =

2
1  1   2

Xat(1  f1)
A
  1
Xat

; (7)
pat
pct
=
C
A
: (8)
Eq. (5), can be rewritten as
Xat =
(1  1   2)A
p
(1  1   2)2A2 + 4(1  f1)(21 + 22   1)A
2(1  f1) ; (9)
and hence for any positive A, i.e., A > 0, the su¢ cient condition for a real solution of Xat is
1 + 2 >
1
2
: (10)
Further, this condition also ensures that there is only one positive solution of Xat and hence
ensures a unique feasible solution of Xat. Henceforward, we assume condition (10) always
holds true. With this condition we nd that the consumption of manufacturing good and
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leisure are strictly positive (from (6) and (7)).
Proposition 1 The farmers food consumption does not change over time. Further, it is
positively related with his entitled food subsidy. These properties also hold for the farmers
labor capacity.
Proof. Condition (10) along with equation (9) gives this.
We can easily see from (5) that higher the farmers subsidy, higher would be his food
consumption. A greater subsidy provided to the farmer increases his food consumption and
hence his labor capacity. Thus, by improving the farmers health, the per-unit subsidy of
f1 on food consumption also acts as food security. To understand this, suppose f1 = 0
and A = 1=(1 + 2). For these values, Xat = 1 which implies L
F
at = 0. Thus at this
level of productivity, the farmer is not eating su¢ ciently to have any labor capacity. Now
suppose the government provides the farmer a per-unit food subsidy, i.e. f1 > 0, then his
food consumption increases to Xat > 1: By providing subsidy, the farmer can now work
as opposed to in the case of no-subsidy when the farmer would not even have existed at
A = 1=(1 + 2). Through this logic we say that food subsidy provides food security as the
marginalized farmer can now meet his subsistence food requirements to live and work. In a
similar manner, we shall see that food subsidy to the entrepreneur also provides him food
security.
2.2 The Representative Entrepreneur
The entrepreneur has an identical labor capacity function as the farmer, which is denoted
by LEt . He employs labor Lmt, capital Kt; and the cash crop qct to produce manufactures
using a CRS Cobb-Douglas production function
Qmt =ML

mtq

ctK
1  
t (11)
where Qmt is manufacturing output and M is TFP of the manufacturing production. Note,
the manufacturing good is the numeraire.
Like the farmer, the entrepreneur is also assumed to be self employed. His felicity function
is same as that of the farmer
UEt = 1 lnYmt + 2 lnYlt;+(1  1   2) lnYat; 0 < 1; 2 < 1
where Ymt is his manufacturing goods consumption, Ylt denotes the entrepreneurs leisure
units, and Yat is the entrepreneurs consumption of the food crop. The entrepreneur spends
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his after-tax income from sale of the manufacturing good on consumption of goods, purchase
of cash crops, and capital investment. Thus, his budget constraint is
(1  f2)patYat + Ymt + pctqct+Kt+1   (1  )Kt =
(1   t)M

1  1
Yat
  Ylt

qctK
1  
t ;
where f2 is the food subsidy given by the government to the entrepreneur and we have sub-
stituted the entrepreneurs full employment condition, i.e. Lmt = LEt  Ylt, for manufacturing
employment in the manufacturing production function. In the income tax regime the tax
burden falls on the capital owning agent and here the entrepreneur pays a proportional tax
of  t on his income from selling manufactures. The assumed structure of taxation mimics the
developing economies. As noted in Gordon and Li (2009), in developing countries, personal
income tax rates are di¤erentiated across di¤erent income groups, where usually the capital
owning agents pay higher taxes. Further, corporate income tax is one of the most important
sources of revenue for these countries. In this sense, by taxing the entrepreneurs income,
we capture both these features of developing economies in our model.
Conditional on his budget and given initial capital stock K0, the entrepreneur maximizes
his lifetime discounted utility by choosing fYat; Ymt; Ylt; qctg1t=0 and fKtg1t=1. The rst order
conditions yield
Ylt =
1  1
Yat
1 + 1
2
(1  t)Qmt
Ymt
; (12)
(Yat   1)

Yat   (1  1   2)
1 (1  f2)
Ymt
pat

=
1
1  f2

2
1
Ymt
pat
+ 
(1   t)Qmt
pat

; (13)
qct =
(1   t)Qmt
pct
; (14)
and the Euler equation,
Ymt+1
Ymt
= 

1   + (1    )(1   t+1)Qmt+1
Kt+1

; (15)
where  is the discount factor.
10
2.3 Market clearing conditions
The manufacturing and agricultural (i.e., food crop and cash crop) goods market clearing
conditions respectively are
Qmt = Kt+1   (1  )Kt +Xmt + Ymt (16)
ALat = Xat + Yat (17)
C

1  1
Xat
 Xlt   Lat

= qct: (18)
Finally, the government balances budget in every time period
f1patXat + f2patYat =  tQmt: (19)
We assume that the subsidies to the beneciaries are xed. So f1 and f2 are given and the
government xes taxes  t to balance its budget.
2.4 Static System
The static system is reduced to the following four equations.
(1   t)Qmt
pat
= A

1  1
Xat

1  22   1
1  1   2

  Xat
A

1  1   2f1
1  1   2

  Yat (20)
Qmt =M
"
1  1
Yat
 1
2
(1  t)Qmt
Ymt
1 + 1
2
(1  t)Qmt
Ymt
# 
C
A
(1   t)Qmt
pat

K1  t (21)
(Yat   1)

Yat   (1  1   2)
1 (1  f2)
Ymt
pat

=
1
1  f2

2
1
Ymt
pat
+ 
(1   t)Qmt
pat

 t =
1
Qmt=pat
 (f1Xa + f2Yat) :
We get the rst equation from (7), (8),(14), (17) and (18). It is the reduced form of agents
food consumption optimization condition and the agricultural goods market clearing con-
ditions. The next equation is derived on substituting the entrepreneurs optimization con-
ditions (12)-(14) into manufacturing production function (11). The last two equations are
from entrepreneurs optimization (13) and from government budget (19) respectively. The
static system yields
Qmt = Qm(Ymt; Kt); Yat = Ya(Ymt; Kt); pat = pa(Ymt; Kt);  t = (Ymt; Kt):
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There are a few of points to note here.
1. The explicit form of the aforementioned functions can not be determined.
2. The [] term in eq. (20) captures the farmers residual labor units after deducting
leisure and labor required to produce own food consumption from the farmers total
labor units i.e. (1   1=Xat)   Xlt   Xat=A. In the absence of subsidy, f1 = 0, we
get from (5) that the farmers residual labor is positive. However, in the subsidy
program the farmers leisure and food consumption increase with his subsidy and we
can show that his residual labor decreases with increase in f1. This implies that there
is an upper-limit to the food subsidy o¤ered to the farmer, beyond which the farmers
residual labor is negative. Now we know from (20) that for positive after-tax income
from manufacturing production, i.e. (1    t)Qmt > 0, it is necessary for the [] term
to be positive. Thus there is an upper-limit to the food subsidy that can be feasibly
o¤ered to the farmer.
3. Even though subsidies are xed in the economy, taxes vary over time.
2.5 Dynamic System
The dynamics of the economy is spelled by Euler equation (15) and the capital accumulation
equation (16). It is determined by the growth of two variables Ymt and Kt. In this economy,
there is no long run growth. At steady state,
Ymt = Y

m; Kt = K

Using this in the dynamic equations (15) and (16), we get
Qm = Y

m + K
 +Xm (22a)
(1   )Qm
K
=
1=   1 + 
1     : (22b)
The above equations with the static system solves for the steady state. Closed form
solution does not exist. We therefore simulate the model for analyzing the change in macro-
economic variables with change in agentssubsidies.
2.6 Simulation
The complexity of the model makes it di¢ cult to analytically solve the model. Hence, we
resort to numerical simulations to characterize the e¤ect of subsidy program on output and
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welfare. For this purpose, India is an ideal economy to model as it is a developing country
which has recently implemented a food security act. The e¤ects of the food subsidy program,
which are calculated in this simulation exercise, would also be relevant for other developing
countries.
The structural parameters for India are xed in accordance with the existing literature,
discount factor is 0:98 and the annual depreciation rate is 0:1 (as in Gabriel et al. (2012)).
We calculate the preference parameters using data from the RBI handbook of statistics and
CSO database. The preference parameter, 2, is taken to be the share of total output which
is not consumed,
2 = 1 
C
Y
where C=Y is the average aggregate consumption to output ratio. The ratio of private
nal consumption expenditure (PFCE) to GDP, averaged over the years 1999-2007, yields
2 = 0:4. Further, as the agents consume two goods  food and manufacturing  their
respective weights are
1 =

VM
VM + VA

 C
Y
; 3 =

VA
VM + VA

 C
Y
;
where VM is the average manufacturing value added, and VA is the average agricultural value
added for the period 1999-2007. We get 1 = 0:24 and 3 = 0:36.
5.
The manufacturing production requires three inputs, namely capital, labor, and cash
crop. Thus, the value of manufacturing output Qmt is the sum of capital payments, wage
payments, and the spending on cash crop intermediates: Similar to the methodology in
Verma (2012), wage payments is estimated by compensation of employees, and the capital
payments by the sum of consumption of xed capital and operating surplus. The estimation
of expenditure on cash crops inputs is a more involved process. Dholakia (2009) tabulates the
input-output (I-O) tables for India in which he reports the cash crop intermediate inputs in
manufacturing production. While Dholakia (2009) reports the I-O table for the years 1968,
1973, 1978, 1983, 1989, 1993, 1999, and 2003, we consider only the last two reported years.
Our choice of this time period is to maintain consistency with the time period for the other
aggregate and sectoral variables. We calculate the average share of cash crop intermediates of
the total intermediates inputs used in producing manufacturing good for the years 1998 and
2003. This gives that cash crop input accounts for about 8.7% of total intermediate goods
consumption in the manufacturing sector. Considering this cash crop input usage constant
over time, we capture the expenditure on cash crops equal to 8.7% of the intermediate
5See Table 3A, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, RBI.
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consumption in manufacturing goods production. Thus, the manufacturing sectors labor
income share equals compensation of employees/(compensation of employees + operating
surplus + consumption of xed capital + 8.7% of intermediates consumption), which gives
 = 0:19. Similarly, we calculate the capital shares,  = 0:25 and 1     = 0:56.
Finally, the productivity parameters are arbitrarily xed at A = 100, C = 100; and
M = 100. Since we are interested in analyzing and comparing the e¤ect of the subsidies f1
and f2 with the no food subsidy case, we conduct our numerical experiments in steady state
for di¤erent values of f1 and f2 2 [0; 1).
2.7 Subsidy Program E¤ects
The tax revenues nance the food subsidy, therefore, it follows that the steady state income
tax increases with the subsidies,   =  (f1
+
; f2
+
). We plot the steady state tax rates for
di¤erent subsidy combinations in Figure 2. The x-axis denotes the farmers subsidy and the
y-axis captures the tax rates. For di¤erent entrepreneurs subsidies we plot di¤erent curves.
As one moves along the x-axis the farmers subsidy increases and as one moves from black
solid line to purple dotted line the entrepreneurs subsidy increases. The gures shows that
from zero taxes in no subsidy program (shown in green line), the taxes increase with both
farmers subsidy as well as entrepreneurs subsidy.
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
2.7.1 On Food Consumption
The subsidy program is intended to primarily a¤ect the agents food consumption. As noted
in Proposition 1, the farmers consumption of food is higher in the food subsidy program.
Xat increases in f1 and is independent of f2.
The subsidy e¤ects on entrepreneurs food consumption is more involved. The entre-
preneurs subsidy has a direct e¤ect on his food consumption. In addition, as his food
consumption linked with farmers production, it is also a¤ected by the farmers subsidy. Our
simulations show that in steady state, the amount of food consumed by the entrepreneur is
positively related to the subsidy he himself gets and negatively related to the farmers sub-
sidy. In particular, the entrepreneurs food consumption is a¤ected by the subsidy program
through two channels through income and through prices. On the one hand, an increase in
f1 and f2 implies that the entrepreneur has to pay higher taxes. This reduces his after-tax
income and hence lowers his consumption of food. On the other hand, an increase in f2
lowers the e¤ective price the entrepreneur has to pay for consuming food. Our simulations
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suggest that in the steady state, for the entrepreneur, the latter e¤ect of f2 dominates the
former e¤ect, i.e., Y a = Y

a (f1 
; f2
+
). This is shown in Figure 3. It is therefore possible that
for a low f1 and a high f2, the entrepreneurs food consumption is higher in the subsidy
program.6
[INSERT FIGURE 3]
The trends in food consumption also determine how the subsidy program inuences the
agentswork capacity. The subsidies unequivocally increase the work capacity of the farmer,
but the e¤ect on the entrepreneurs work capacity depends on the subsidy combination. The
low f1 and high f2 combination at which the direct benets of a higher f2 dominates the
indirect detriments of higher taxation increases the work capacity of the entrepreneur.
2.7.2 On Farmers Production
The food subsidy program has opposite e¤ects on the farmers production of the food crop
and the cash crop. Simulations show that the food crop output increases in both subsidies
while the cash crop output decreases in both subsidies. We have shown that the farmers
subsidy boosts his food consumption, but not the entrepreneurs food consumption. In
contrast, the entrepreneurs food subsidy increases the entrepreneurs food consumption and
has no e¤ect on the farmers food consumption. The net e¤ect is that both subsidies raise
demand for food and yield Qa = Q

a(f1
+
; f2
+
). As a result, the food output is always higher
in the presence of the food subsidy program. This is shown in Figure 4. This implies
employment in the food production increases with subsidies.
The e¤ect of subsidies on the production of the cash crop is exactly opposite, as illustrated
in Figure 5. To comprehend this, let us rewrite eq. (20) at steady state as
Qc = C

1  1
Xa

1  22   1
1  1   2

  X

a
A

1  1   2f1
1  1   2

  C
A
Y a : (23)
We have already noted that the farmers residual labor, [:] term above, is decreasing in f1.
In addition, our simulations show that the entrepreneurs food consumption, Y a , decreases
in f1 and increases in f2. These two ndings together indicate that with increase in both f1
and f2 the farmer shifts his labor units involved in production (total labor minus leisure)
6In the case of equal subsidies, i.e. f1 = f2, the the entrepreneurs food consumption is decreasing in the
food subsidy. So it is the negative e¤ect of higher taxes which dominates the positive food price e¤ect and
the net result is that this subsidy program adversely e¤ects Y a . It is important to highlight that if equal
subsidies are o¤ered to both agents, the farmers food consumption increases but it reduces the entrepreneurs
food consumption, in which case, the program provides additional food security only to the farmer.
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towards food production and away from cash crop production. As a result, Lc = L

c(f1 
; f2
 
)
and Qc = Q

c(f1 
; f2
 
). Thus, the food subsidy program, by increasing the demand for food
production, adversely a¤ects the cash crop output, as shown in Figure 5.
[INSERT FIGURE 4]
[INSERT FIGURE 5]
2.7.3 On Entrepreneurs Production
To understand the e¤ects of subsides on the manufacturing output, we rewrite the steady
state manufacturing production function as
(Qm)
+ =M

1=   1 + 
1    
1  
(1   )1   (Lm) (qc )
where we have used (22b) to substitute for K.As already discussed, subsidies unequivocally
increase taxes and reduce the supply of cash crop. So the e¤ect of subsidies through  and
qc is to reduce manufacturing output. At the same time, the subsidies may increase the
labor capacity of the entrepreneur which implies that subsidies may possibly increase the
manufacturing employment. Our simulations suggest that the subsidies a¤ect the manufac-
turing employment in the same way as entrepreneurs work capacity, i.e., Lm = L

m(f1 
; f2
+
).
As shown in Figure 6, compared to the economy without the food subsidy program, a higher
subsidy to the entrepreneur along with a low subsidy to the farmer increase Lm.
[INSERT FIGURE 6]
Summing up, the farmers subsidy increases taxes, reduces the cash crop output, and re-
duces manufacturing employment. It is evident that f1 unambiguously reduces the manufac-
turing output. However, the net e¤ect of f2 on the manufacturing output is not obvious. We
look at the simulation results in Figure 7 and nd that the manufacturing output decreases
with increases in entrepreneurs subsidy, f2. It appears that the e¤ect of f2 on lowering
the cash crop and raising taxes dominates the positive e¤ect it has on the manufacturing
employment. Hence, Qm = Q

m(f1 
; f2
 
).
[INSERT FIGURE 7]
Further, as the subsidy program lowers the manufacturing output, from (22b), it follows
that subsidies also lower steady state capital stock. Increase in f1 and f2 implies a higher tax
and a lower manufacturing output, which reduces the entrepreneurs after-tax income and
hence adversely a¤ects capital accumulation. This is depicted in Figure 8, K = K(f1
 
; f2
 
).
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[INSERT FIGURE 8]
2.7.4 On Prices
The simulations yield that the relative prices of food and cash crops are negatively related
to the two subsidies. As shown in Figures 9 and 10, pa = p

a(f1 
; f2
 
) and pc = p

c(f1 
; f2
 
).
[INSERT FIGURE 9]
[INSERT FIGURE 10]
To understand this, recall that the subsides increase the demand of the food crop and
reduces the supply of the manufacturing good. This increases the nominal price of both the
food crop and the manufacturing good. The increase in the nominal price of the manufac-
turing good is however higher than that of the food crop, which implies that the price of
the food crop relative to the manufacturing good falls with subsidies. Thus, both subsidies
lower pa. Further, from equation (8), we know that p

a and p

c are one-to-one linked. As a
result, the relative price of the cash crop also falls in steady state.
2.7.5 On Welfare
The representative farmer and the entrepreneur derive utility from consuming the manufac-
turing good, leisure, and food. In steady state, the representative farmers per-period utility
is given by
 F = 1 lnX

m(f1 
; f2
 
) + 2 lnX

l (f1
+
; f2
0
) + (1  1   2) lnXa(f1
+
; f2
0
):
Our simulations suggest that the subsidy program lowers Xm, as depicted in Figure 11.
Intuitively, both subsidies make manufacturing consumption more expensive as compared to
food consumption (as pa falls), which lowers the demand for the manufacturing good.
It is easy to see that f1 has two opposing e¤ects on the farmers welfare. On the one hand,
it reduces the consumption of the manufacturing good and on the other hand it increases the
consumption of leisure and agricultural good. We therefore nd that for any given f2, there
exists an interior value of f1 where the farmers welfare is maximum. Further, the farmers
welfare is strictly decreasing in f2. The farmers per-period welfare is shown in Figure 12.
[INSERT FIGURE 11]
[INSERT FIGURE 12]
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Our simulations suggest that for low levels of f2 and medium levels of f1 the farmers
welfare may be higher in the subsidy program.
The entrepreneurs steady state per-period utility is given by
 E = 1 lnY

m(f1 
; f2
 
) + 2 lnY

l (f1 
; f2
+
) + (1  1   2) lnY a (f1  ; f2+ ):
The e¤ect of the subsidy program on Y m and Y

l are plotted in Figures 13 and 14 respectively.
As in the farmers case, due to an increase in the relative price of the manufacturing good
as compared to the food crop, the entrepreneur reduces manufacturing consumption, which
explains Y m(f1 
; f2
 
). Further, the entrepreneurs leisure follows the same trend as his work
capacity it increases with f2 and decreases with f1. It is clear that f1 has an overall negative
e¤ect on the entrepreneurs welfare. The entrepreneurs food subsidy f2, though negatively
a¤ects the consumption of manufacturing good, it increases leisure and consumption of the
food crop. The entrepreneurs welfare e¤ects in Figure 15 suggest that for any given f1,
there exists an interior value of f2 where the entrepreneurs welfare is at its highest.
[INSERT FIGURE 13]
[INSERT FIGURE 14]
[INSERT FIGURE 15]
Our simulations depict that for low levels of f1 and medium levels of f2 the entrepreneurs
welfare may be higher in the subsidy program. Our simulations also show that improvement
in welfare of one agent comes at the expense of the other agent. We do not nd any subsidy
combination at which both agents gain from the subsidy program. However, if we look at
the sum of welfare of the two agents, there are some combinations of subsidies at which the
aggregate welfare of the economy is higher in the subsidy program (see Figure 16).
[INSERT FIGURE 16]
3 Consumption Tax Regime
In this section, we investigate an alternate form of nancing the food subsidy program, i.e.,
imposing a tax on manufacturing consumption on the farmer and the entrepreneur. The
idea is to see if a change in the method of nancing the subsidy program has any di¤erential
e¤ects on the economy. Importantly, unlike in the income tax regime where the entrepreneur
solely bears the burden of taxation, in the consumption tax regime, the government taxes the
farmers and the entrepreneurss consumption of the manufacturing good at a uniform rate
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 st. Except for the budget constraint, the two agentsoptimization problem is unchanged.
The farmers new budget is
(1  f1)psatXsat + (1 +  st)Xsmt = psatALsat + psctC

1  1
Xsat
  Lsat  Xslt

: (24)
It is intuitive that the farmers optimization conditions with respect to manufacturing con-
sumption changes
Xsmt =

1
1  1   2

psatA
1 +  st

Xsat (1  f1)
A
  1
Xsat

: (25)
whereas other conditions remain as in the previous income tax regime, i.e., (5), (7) and (8).
Therefore,
Xsat = Xat; X
s
lt = Xlt (26)
i.e., the farmers food consumption and leisure are unchanged in the consumption tax regime.
As a result, the farmers total labor endowment LFst also remains unchanged, i.e.,
LFst = 1 
1
Xat
= 1  1
Xsat
= LFt : (27)
We summarize this as follows:
Proposition 2 The farmers food consumption, his total labor endowment and his leisure
are unchanged in the income tax regime and manufacturing consumption tax regime.
The new tax regime similarly alters the entrepreneurs problem. His utility function is
same as in the previous regime but now his manufacturing consumption, instead of income,
is taxed. The entrepreneurs new budget constraint is
(1  f2)psatY sat + (1 +  st)Y smt + psctqsct+Kst+1   (1  )Kst =
M

1  1
Y sat
  Y slt

(qsct)
 (Kst )
1   :
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The rst order conditions are
Y slt =
1  1
Y sat
1 + 1
2
Qsmt
(1+st)Y smt
; (28)
(Y sat   1)

Y sat  
(1  1   2)
1 (1  f2)
(1 +  st)Y
s
mt
psat

=
1
1  f2

2
1
(1 +  st)Y
s
mt
psat
+ 
Qsmt
psat

;(29)
qsct =
Qsmt
psct
; (30)
and the Euler equation is
(1 +  st+1)Y
s
mt+1
(1 +  st)Y smt
= 

1   + (1    )Q
s
mt+1
Kst+1

: (31)
The goods market clearing conditions are unchanged as in (16), (17) and (18). As before,
for any given f1 and f2,the government xes taxes to balance its budget, which now is
f1p
s
atX
s
at + f2p
s
atY
s
at =  st(X
s
mt + Y
s
mt): (32)
3.1 Static System
The economy can be expressed in four equations, which constitute the static system

Qsmt
psat
=

A

1  1
Xsat

1  22   1
1  1   2

 Xsat

1  1   2f1
1  1   2

  Y sat (33)
Qsmt =M
"
1  1
Y sat
 1
2
Qsmt
(1+st)Y smt
1 + 1
2
Qsmt
(1+st)Y smt
# 
C
A
Qsmt
psat

[Kst ]
1   (34)
(Y sat   1)

Y sat  
(1  1   2)
1 (1  f2)
(1 +  st)Y
s
mt
psat

=
1
1  f2

2
1
(1 +  st)Y
s
mt
psat
+ 
Qsmt
psat

 st

1
1  1   2

A
1 +  st

Xsat (1  f1)
A
  1
Xsat

+
Y smt
psat

= f1X
s
at + f2Y
s
at: (35)
The rst equation is the reduced form of the food and cash crop optimization, and mar-
ket clearing conditions. The next equation is derived on substituting the entrepreneurs
optimization conditions (28)-(30) into manufacturing production function (11). The third
equation is the entrepreneurs optimization condition (29) and the last is the government
budget constraint, where we have substituted for Xmt=pat from (25) into (32) to get (35).
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Note, we already know the value of Xsat from (5), hence the static system yields
Qsmt = Q
s
m(Y
s
mt; K
s
t ); Y
s
at = Y
s
a (Y
s
mt; K
s
t ); p
s
at = p
s
a(Y
s
mt; K
s
t );  st =  s(Y
s
mt; K
s
t ):
3.2 Steady State
The capital accumulation equation (16) and the Euler equation (31) constitute the dynamic
equations of the economy. In steady state, the dynamic variables are constant so
Y smt = Y
s
m ; K
s
t = K
s
and from the dynamic equations we get
Qsm = K
s + Y sm +X
s
m (36a)
Qsm
Ks
=
1=   1 + 
1     : (36b)
The above equations along with the static system solves for the steady state. In this
regime, as was in the previous case, closed form steady state solutions do not exist. However,
it can be shown,
Proposition 3 In steady state, the entrepreneurs consumption of the food crop is same in
the consumption tax regime as in the income tax regime, i.e., Y sa = Y

a :
Proof. See Appendix
The intuition lies in the fact that the two methods of nancing do not alter the behavior
of the economy in steady state. In the income tax regime, depending on entrepreneurs food
consumption, the cash crop employment is determined which in turn determines the entre-
preneurs disposable income in terms of food prices (eq. (20)). This yields (1  ) (Qm=pa) as
a function of Y a . This relation together with the steady state relation (22b) and the steady
state entrepreneurs budget, (1   f2)Y a + (Ymt=pa) = (1   ) (1   ) (Qm=pa)   (K=pa),
determines the budget-wise link between (Y m=p

a) and Y

a . Finally all these links are brought
together in optimization condition (13) which solves for Y a . A change in the tax regime
a¤ects the variables but not the linkages. As compared to the income tax regime, in the
presence of consumption tax, the entrepreneurs disposable income is Qm=p

a and his ex-
penditure on manufacturing good consumption, in terms of food prices, is (1 +  s) (Y

m=p

a).
Apart from this the chain of how demand for the entrepreneurs food determines the supply
of cash crop, which in turn is linked with the entrepreneurs disposable income in terms of
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food prices, which nally determines the entrepreneurs food consumption, is exactly the
same in both tax regimes. This explains Y sa = Y

a .
Proposition 3, together with eqs. (12) and (28) yields that the entrepreneurs steady
state total labor units, manufacturing employment and leisure remain unchanged in the two
tax regimes. That is,
LEs = LE; Lsm = L

m; Y
s
l = Y

l :
Further, Proposition 3 along with (26) implies that in steady state the farmers allocation
of labor for food production and production of cash crops also remain unchanged in the two
tax regimes, i.e.,
Lsa = L

a; L
s
c = L

c :
We summarize these ndings as follows.
Proposition 4 In steady state, the sectoral employments (in food crop, cash crop and man-
ufacturing output production) are unchanged in the two tax regimes. Further, in steady state,
the entrepreneurs leisure is una¤ected by the tax structures.
Proof. Discussed above.
The unchanged employment in food and cash crops sectors imply that food and cash crop
outputs are same in the two tax regimes. However, this equality does not hold for steady
state manufacturing output:
Proposition 5 The steady state capital and the steady state manufacturing output is higher
in the consumption tax regime compared to the income tax regime, i.e., Ks > K and Qsm >
Qm. Therefore the steady state relative price of the food crop is higher in the consumption
tax regime, i.e., psa > p

a:
Proof. Substituting the steady state eqs (22b) and (36b) into their respective manufacturing
production functions (21) and (34), we get
Qsm
Qm
= (1   )  1  + > 1.
In both regimes, the steady marginal product of capital is the same (eqs. (22b) and (36b)).
However, in the income tax regime, the after-tax value of manufacturing output is lower,
hence capital stock is lower in this regime,
Ks
K
=
Qsm
(1   )Qm
> 1:
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Further, as the food consumptions are equal in the two tax regimes, the cash crop market
clearing conditions (20) and (33) yield,
psa
pa
=
Qsm
(1   )Qm
> 1.
The higher food prices, with no change in cash crop and food crop output, implies
that farmers income is higher in the consumption tax regime. As his food consumption
is una¤ected by the tax structure, the increase in his income is spent on increasing his
manufacturing goods consumption. Similar increase in entrepreneurs income translates into
higher manufacturing consumption by the entrepreneur. We summarize this as follows
Proposition 6 The steady state consumption of the manufacturing output for the farmer
and the entrepreneur is higher in the consumption tax regime compared to the income tax
regime, i.e., Xsm > X

m and Y
s
m > Y

m.
Proof. From steady state eqs. (22a) and (36a) we get,
Xsm + Y
s
m
Xm + Y m
=
1  	
1  (1   )	
Qsm
Qm
=
1  	
1  (1   )	
1
(1   ) 1  +
 
( ); (37)
where 	 = (1      )=(1=   1 + ). It is easy to see that 
(0) = 1 and 
(1) = 1.
Further 
0( ) > 0. Thus for 1 >   > 0 it is evident that 
( ) > 1. In other words, the
total manufacturing consumption by the two agents in the food subsidy program is higher
in the presence of consumption tax as compared to income tax. Now, as Y sa = Y

a and
Qsm=p
s
a = (1   )(Qm=pa), we get from (13) and (29) that
(1 +  s)Y
s
m
psa
=
Y m
pa
: (38)
The above expression together with (6) and (25) yields
(1 +  s)
psa
(Xsm + Y
s
m ) =
1
pa
(Xm + Y

m) : (39)
We know Xsm + Y
s
m > X

m+ Y

m and with the aforementioned relation, we get (p
s
a =p

a)  (1+
 s)
 1 > 1. This further with (38) and (39) gives Xsm > X

m and Y
s
m > Y

m.
The higher manufacturing consumption in the consumption tax regime also implies that
the utility of both agents is now higher. That is,
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Proposition 7 The steady state per-period utilities of the farmer and the entrepreneur is
higher in the consumption tax regime as compared to the income tax regime, i.e.,  sF >  F
and  sE >  E.
Proof. As Xsa = X

a , X
s
l = X

l and X
s
m > X

m, it gives that utility of the farmer is higher
in the consumption tax regime as compared to income tax regime,  sF >  F . Similarly,
as Y sa = Y

a , Y
s
l = Y

l and Y
s
m > Y

m, the utility of the entrepreneur is higher in the
consumption tax regime as compared to income tax regime,  sE >  E.
Thus, nancing this program using an indirect consumption tax regime compared to a
direct income tax regime is Pareto improving. This is because in the steady state, moving
from the income tax regime to the consumption tax regime causes an increase in the con-
sumption of the manufacturing output by both agents. As a result, sharing the tax burden,
by imposing an indirect tax, is Pareto superior. An interesting normative insight we get is
that sharing the tax burden between the farmer and the entrepreneur  via manufacturing
consumption tax is benecial in terms of aggregate welfare.
3.3 Simulation
For the same parameter values used in the income tax regime, we simulate the model to
determine long run e¤ects of the subsidy program on the economy in the consumption tax
regime. As shown in Figure 17, compared to the no-subsidy case, the consumption tax is
positive. Further, since the government xes the tax rate for a given pair of farmers and
entrepreneurs subsidies, higher the subsidies, the government would have to set a higher tax
rate  s = 

s(f1
+
; f2
+
).
[INSERT FIGURE 17]
3.3.1 On Outputs
We have already shown that Xsa = X

a and Y

a = Y
s
a . Hence the food consumption plot for
the entrepreneur is the same as in Figure 3. Further, employment in the food crop and cash
crop production are same as were in the income tax regime. Thus, the farmers production
of the food crop and cash crop are exactly the same as in the previous regime (shown in
Figures 4 and 5). Simulations show that in this regime too, subsidies reduce steady the
state manufacturing output as well as capital. The subsidy program reduces the cash crop
production and this adversely a¤ect manufacturing production, which in turn also lowers
the steady state capital stock. These e¤ects are shown in Figures 18 and 19.
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[INSERT FIGURE 18]
[INSERT FIGURE 19]
3.3.2 On Price
The subsidy e¤ect on the relative prices di¤ers in the income tax regime and consumption
tax regime. In the consumption tax regime, the relative price of the food crop increases
with higher f1 and f2; i.e., psa = p
s
a (f1
+
; f2
+
). An increase in f1 and f2, increases the demand
for the food crop and therefore increases the nominal price of food. The consumption tax
reduces the demand for manufacturing consumption good which reduces the nominal price
of manufacturing good. The joint e¤ect is an increase in the relative price of the food crop.
Since psc is proportional to p
s
a ; p
s
c = p
s
c (f1
+
; f2
+
). The e¤ect of subsidies on the food crop
and cash crop relative prices is shown in Figures 20 and 21.
[INSERT FIGURE 20]
[INSERT FIGURE 21]
3.3.3 On Welfare
As in the income tax regime, the representative farmers per-period steady state utility is
given by
 Fs = 1 lnX
s
m (f1 
; f2
 
) + 2 lnX
s
l (f1
+
; f2
0
) + (1  1   2) lnXsa (f1
+
; f2
0
);
and similarly, the representative entrepreneurs steady state per-period utility is given by
 Es = 1 lnY
s
m (f1 
; f2
 
) + 2 lnY
s
l (f1
+
; f2
0
) + (1  1   2) lnY sa (f1
+
; f2
0
):
Financing the subsidy program using tax on manufacturing consumption does not qualita-
tively change agentswelfare e¤ects. The e¤ects of subsidies are still the same, except that
the magnitude of the e¤ects have altered. We present in Figures 22 and 23 that the two
subsidies have a negative e¤ect on the manufacturing consumption of both agents.
[INSERT FIGURE 22]
[INSERT FIGURE 23]
The welfare of the farmer and the entrepreneur for di¤erent subsidies is shown in Figures
24 and 25 respectively. We present the aggregate welfare in Figure 26.
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[INSERT FIGURE 24]
[INSERT FIGURE 25]
[INSERT FIGURE 26]
As discussed before, simulations also show that welfare gains are higher in consumption
tax regime as compared to income tax regime. An increase in consumption of the manu-
facturing good and unaltered consumptions of the food crop and leisure, by both farmer
and entrepreneur, explains higher welfare gains in the consumption tax regime. Further, the
entrepreneur witnesses larger welfare gains than the farmer as a result of moving from the
income tax to the consumption tax regime. The simulation results for welfare gains from
the subsidy program in the two tax regimes, for the case of f2 = 0:81 and di¤erent levels
of f1, are shown in Figure 27. The pattern does not change for di¤erent subsidy combina-
tions. Intuitively, switching from the income tax regime to the consumption tax regime has
resulted in an increase in incomes for the farmer and the entrepreneur, which results in an
increase in the consumption of the manufacturing output. In addition, higher gains for the
entrepreneur are on the account of sharing the tax burden with the farmer. On normative
grounds therefore, our model suggests that despite there being marginal gains from introduc-
ing the subsidy program, it is better to nance such a scheme using a uniform distortionary
consumption tax compared to a discriminatory income tax regime.
[INSERT FIGURE (27)]
4 Conclusion
Our work is motivated by the recent food security schemes announced across several devel-
oping and middle income economies to fulll their millennium developmental goals. Several
economies like India and South Africa have made "Right to Food" as a constitutional act.
The objective of our paper was to analyze the e¤ects of a food subsidy program on output
and employment. To do this, we build a two sector heterogenous agent model of a farmer and
an entrepreneur, both of whom are eligible for a subsidy on food consumption. The novelty
of our paper is that food consumption augments the labor capacity of a representative agent
who then decides how to allocate this capacity towards work and leisure. This ensures "food
security" even with low levels of agricultural productivity.
We then assume two di¤erent tax regimes. The government may nance this subsidy
by levying a distortionary income tax or through a tax on manufacturing consumption. In
the long run, the subsidy program increases the output of the food sector but lowers the
manufacturing output, independent of the method of its nancing. While the price of food
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crop relative to the price of manufacturing good falls under an income tax regime, it increases
under the consumption tax regime.
We also determine the welfare e¤ects of the food subsidy program on the farmer and the
entrepreneur under both tax regimes. The program may have long-run welfare gains for the
two agents only for a certain range of subsidies. However, nancing this program using an
indirect consumption tax regime is Pareto superior to a direct income tax regime.
This exercise also suggests that introducing a universal food subsidy program may not
necessarily have large benets for an economy in the long run. Introducing other welfare
measures to enhance labor productivity, for instance, may complement a subsidy program
which has partial coverage. This will also enable us to analyze the e¤ectiveness of introducing
such welfare schemes in highly debt driven economies. Future work can therefore extend this
framework by adding public debt as an alternative source of nancing the subsidy program.
We may also extend our model by allowing for international trade.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
As the tax regimes does not di¤erentially a¤ect the farmers optimization conditions, so
Xat = X
s
at. Further from eqs. (20) and (33) we get,
(1   t)Qmt
pat
= 1(Yat);
Qsmt
psat
= 1(Y
s
at): (40)
The two functional forms are same. forms of This implies that the respective implicit
functions are equal. In steady state of the income tax regime, using (19), (22a) and (22b)
we get
Y m
pa
= f1X

a + f2Y

a +

1=   1 + 
1       

1    
1=   1 + 

(1   )Qsm
psa
(41)
 

1
1  1   2

A

Xsa (1  f1)
A
  1
Xsa

;
and similarly in the consumption tax regime using (35) , (36b), and (36a), we get
(1 +  s)
Y sm
psa
= f1X
s
a + f2Y
s
a +

1=   1 + 
1       

1    
1=   1 + 

Qsm
psa
(42)
 

1
1  1   2

A

Xsa (1  f1)
A
  1
Xsa

:
As Xa = X
s
a and together with (40), (41) and (42) we get
Y m
pa
= 2(Y

a ); (1 + 

s)
Y sm
psa
= 2(Y
s
a ): (43)
Substituting (40), (43) in the entrepreneurs food optimization condition (13) and (29) we
get that in steady state
Y a = Y
s
a :
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Figure 27: Percentage gains in welfare for f2 = 0:81
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